10 min read (2,167 words)
UEFI Secure Boot introduces significant risk by validating component signatures in isolation while leaving critical configuration data unauthenticated. This fragmented approach creates a weakness, allowing adversaries to subvert the entire chain of trust or execute rollback attacks using older, vulnerable kernels that still carry valid signatures.
Mercury’s RelianceOne™ mitigates these flaws by employing multiple defensive techniques to include a TPM backed measured boot approach wherein TPM stored cryptographic keys are only released if the entire environment matches a verified state, a TPM monotonic counter to prevent downgrade attacks, and an optional lightweight Rust-based hypervisor to continuously monitor CPU security registers.
Read this white paper to learn about:
- Vulnerabilities from isolating component validation and unauthenticated configuration data.
- Using TPM PCRs to unlock keys only when the entire system matches a verified state.
- Hardware-enforced monotonic counters that permanently block outdated, vulnerable software.
- A lightweight Rust hypervisor that protects CPU registers and security features in real-time.
- Utilizing DRTM to "reboot trust" and isolate the system from early boot compromises.
