Blog: Zero Trust and the Software Supply Chain Threat

November 17, 2026 Mercury Systems

Modern software is rarely produced entirely from scratch. By using prebuilt open-source or third-party components as the building blocks of an application, developers can deliver innovative software faster and more affordably.

Building a software application this way creates what is known as a software supply chain. Just as a supply chain for a physical product would contain everything that is required for production, a supply chain for a software application includes everything it comprises. This includes components from developer-written source code to prebuilt open-source or proprietary frameworks, libraries, packages and application programming interfaces (APIs).

This growing reliance on a supply chain of third-party and open-source elements has also made them a target, with the components that make up modern software increasingly under attack. Successful attacks can be devastating: once malicious code gets into an application through an otherwise trusted code or library, threat actors can exploit runtime vulnerabilities, bypass static security controls, gain unauthorized access, control entire systems, and steal data.

Third-Party and Open-Source Supply Chain Attacks

Software supply chain attacks take many forms, with threat actors using a range of techniques to insert vulnerabilities into otherwise trusted components.

For example:

  • Hackers used compromised credentials to infiltrate network management company SolarWinds in 2019 in a third-party supply chain attack. Instead of directly attacking the company’s customers, including the U.S. government, the hackers injected malicious code into unreleased updates for its Orion software. Once the otherwise legitimate updates were pushed, the attackers gained access to widespread customer network data and performance logs.
  • Automated attacks are becoming more common, such as the May 2026 “Megalodon Incident” open-source supply chain attack on thousands of GitHub repositories. Attackers used automated application programming interface (API) scripts tied to fake bot accounts to push nearly 6,000 malicious modifications, disguising them as regular maintenance activities, over a six-hour period. Stolen information included credentials, Secure Shell (SSH) private keys and vault and access tokens.
  • Typosquatting is traditionally meant to trick users into visiting malicious websites with slightly misspelled web addresses (e.g., face-book.com, gogle.com). But threat actors are using the same concept to attack the supply chain by releasing malware-ridden open-source packages that are named similarly to popular and well-trusted packages (e.g., jquery vs. jquerry).
  • Mass uploads of malicious packages to open-source repositories are another increasing avenue of attack. In 2023, threat actor group Banana Squad is reported to have uploaded hundreds of infected packages under several usernames. The packages were downloaded 75,000 times before they were found and removed.

Attacks like these that exploit trust in widely used components, automated processes and developer workflows will only increase. Preventing them across the software life cycle requires a zero-trust security approach from early development through post-deployment maintenance.

Never Trust, Always Verify

  • Every component, whether open-source or proprietary, must be continuously verified, monitored and validated before it is trusted in development or production. This “never trust, always verify” mindset can be applied through the following practices:
  • Automated software bill of materials (SBOM): Create and maintain a machine-readable inventory of every component in the application, including each component’s name, supplier or creator, version, dependencies and licensing details. Security tools can then use the SBOM to continuously identify known vulnerabilities across the software supply chain.
  • Verification and vulnerability scanning: Verify the integrity of components and scan them and their dependencies for known vulnerabilities before use in development or production, then continuously monitor them for newly disclosed risks.
  • Monitor applications at runtime: Deploy runtime application self-protection technologies to identify suspicious runtime behaviors.
  • Strict authentication and provenance: Require cryptographic signatures, attestations and transparency logs for every package to verify who produced it and how it was built.
  • Enforce version pinning: Lock, or pin, all software external dependencies to a specific and tested version so they cannot be changed by automatic and untested updates.
  • Integrity checks: Validate hashes and signatures at each stage of the pipeline to ensure components have not been modified or tampered with after publication.
  • Access controls: Limit who can introduce, approve, or update third-party components in the development pipeline to reduce the risk of unauthorized or unreviewed changes.
  • Patch and update governance: Establish a process to rapidly assess, test, approve and apply security updates to dependencies throughout the software life cycle.

Zero trust is critical for software supply chain security

For commercial, government and defense organizations, protecting against software supply chain attacks requires recognizing software components cannot be trusted simply because they are widely used or delivered by familiar sources. A zero-trust approach to software supply chain security treats every package, update, dependency and build process as potentially untrusted until it has been verified. By combining visibility through SBOMs, rigorous validation and scanning, strong authentication and provenance controls, runtime monitoring, and disciplined patch governance, organizations can reduce the likelihood that a single compromised component will become a widespread breach.

In an environment in which attackers increasingly target trusted components, integrating a zero-trust approach is critical for security, especially for embedded and edge systems that operate in remote and extreme environments. Learn more about zero trust and its role in the zero-trust security model, architecture, and data security — the rest of this series. Next, see how these same principles extend to post-quantum encryption and OS-level cyber resilience.

Zero trust is the architecture that makes cyber resilience possible — it is part of a modern security framework and aligns with government and commercial cybersecurity strategy alike. Mercury Systems is a technology company delivering signal solutions, software applications, networking, storage and secure processing in support of aerospace, defense and commercial critical infrastructure missions. Mercury’s RelianceOne™ hardens operationally deployed systems and boosts their cyber resilience to protect data and operations.

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